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Thomas	Hofweber	has	written	a	very	rich	book.	In	line	with	the	conviction	that	ontology	should	be	
informed	by	linguistic	considerations,	he	develops	a	systematic	approach	to	central	ontological	
questions	as	they	arise	in	different	regions	of	discourse.	More	generally,	the	book	seeks	to	cast	light	
upon	the	nature	of	ontology	and	its	proper	place	in	inquiry.	His	preferred	methodology	is	not	without	
consequence:	it	promises,	for	example,	to	solve	what	otherwise	look	like	intractable	philosophical	
puzzles	raised	by	arithmetical	practice	and	numerical	discourse,	and,	likewise,	his	treatment	of	
propositional	discourse	has	ramifications	for	larger	questions	to	do	with	the	prospects	of	metaphysical	
inquiry	generally.	
In	what	follows,	I	would	like	to	comment	on	the	general	approach	to	ontology	and	to	look	at	the	
special	case	of	propositional	discourse	and	its	ramifications	for	metaphysics.	
	
1. Quantification	and	Ontology	
At	the	heart	of	the	book	is	the	thesis	that	quantifiers	are	semantically	underspecified.	There	is	at	least	a	
distinction	between	an	external	and	an	internal	reading	of	a	quantifier.	The	external	reading	is	tied	to	
the	representational	role	of	the	quantifier	whereby	the	world	is	portrayed	to	come	with	a	domain	of	
objects	over	which	the	quantifier	ranges.	On	the	external	reading,	the	truth	conditions	of	a	quantified	
sentence	are	given	in	terms	of	a	condition	on	an	external	domain	of	individual	objects:	a	sentence	of	the	
form	‘something	is	A’	is	true	if,	and	only	if,	some	member	of	the	external	domain	is	in	the	extension	of	A.	
Other	quantifiers	are	associated	with	different	conditions	on	the	external	domain.	
On	the	internal	reading,	however,	a	quantifier	is	governed	by	its	inferential	role.	The	quantifier	
‘something’,	for	example,	is	governed	by	a	rule	of	existential	generalization,	which	allows	it	to	act	much	
like	a	trace	for	its	substitution	instances.	By	a	substitution	instance,	however,	Hofweber	doesn’t	merely	
mean	a	referential	expression	–	a	determiner	like	‘two’	is,	by	his	lights,	an	important	counterexample	to	
the	identification	–	nor	merely	an	expression	that	can	occupy	the	same	syntactic	position	as	the	
quantifier	–	a	quantifier	phrase	like	‘nothing’	would	likewise	refute	this	criterion.1
Of	course	to	make	the	inferential	role	of	the	quantifier	precise,	we	should	specify	the	class	of	
appropriate	substitution	instances.	This	is	quite	a	substantive	task,	but	we	can	in	the	meantime,	make	do	
with	our	ordinary	judgments	as	to	what	constitutes	a	valid	instance	of	existential	generalization.	What's	
important	for	now	is	the	observation	that	on	the	internal	reading	of	the	quantifier,	the	specification	of	
the	truth	conditions	of	a	sentence	like	‘something	is	A’	require	no	mention	of	an	external	domain.	
Instead,	they	boil	down	to	the	truth	conditions	of	a	sentence	of	what	would	be	an	infinitary	extension	of	
a	fragment	of	English:	‘ !	#$	%&∈( ’,	where	)	is	the	set	of	appropriate	substitutions	for	the	quantifier.	The	
account	is	different	for	other	quantifiers:	the	truth	conditions	of	a	universally	quantified	sentence	
‘everything	is	A’	come	down	to	the	truth	conditions	of	an	infinite	conjunction	of	the	form	‘ !	#$	%&∈( ’.	
Much	more	delicate	is	the	case	of	generalized	quantifiers	like	‘most	A	are	B’	or	‘few	A	are	B’,	but	they	too	
are	covered	by	the	proposal.2	
	 The	focus	on	the	unary	existential	quantifier	is	far	from	coincidental.	The	primary	ontological	
question	for	numerical	discourse,	for	example,	is	whether	something	is	a	number	on	the	external	
reading	of	the	existential	quantifier.	And	similarly	for	many	other	basic	ontological	questions	in	other	
areas	of	inquiry.	One	would	like	to	know	how	best	to	tackle	these	questions,	and	more	generally,	
whether	they	fall	within	the	remit	of	metaphysics	or	are	to	be	settled	by	other	parts	of	inquiry.		
The	distinction	between	the	internal	and	external	reading	of	the	quantifiers	informs	Hofweber's	
methodology.	He	recommends	we	start	with	the	question	of	whether	the	quantifiers	are	generally	read	
internally	or	externally	in	a	given	area	of	discourse.	The	answer	to	this	question	determines	an	answer	
to	the	primary	ontological	question	for	the	relevant	domain	as	well	as	a	verdict	as	to	whether	it	falls	
within	the	remit	of	metaphysics	or	some	other	part	of	inquiry.	Numerical	discourse	is	a	case	in	point.	
Hofweber	argues	that	as	generally	used	in	arithmetic	and	ordinary	discourse,	numerical	terms	are	not	
referential	expressions	and	numerical	quantifiers	are	read	internally	and	not	externally:	they	don't	
purport	to	range	over	an	external	domain	of	objects.	Moreover,	internalism	for	numerical	discourse	
entails	a	negative	answer	to	the	primary	ontological	question	of	whether	something	is	a	number	–	on	the	
external	reading	of	the	quantifier.	This	question	falls	within	the	remit	of	metaphysics	but	it’s	guaranteed	
to	have	a	negative	answer.	
The	internalist	program	for	numerical	discourse	yields	a	solution	to	what	Hofweber	calls	the	
central	tension	in	the	philosophy	of	arithmetic.	That’s	the	problem	of	reconciling	the	objectivity	of	
arithmetic	and	the	fact	that	it	seems	to	enjoy	a	subject	matter	of	its	own	with	the	fact	that	thought	alone	
appears	to	suffice	to	make	progress	in	arithmetic.	Internalism	provides	a	solution	to	this	problem:	one	
grants	that	natural	numbers	provide	a	subject	matter	for	arithmetic	and	nevertheless	disavows	any	
reading	of	this	claim	on	which	natural	numbers	are	themselves	objects	in	the	external	domain.		
But	versions	of	the	central	tension	arise	for	other	areas	of	mathematical	discourse,	and	there	is	
no	guarantee	that	they	can	–	or	should	–	be	settled	by	similar	means.	The	arguments	for	numerical	
internalism	are	quite	subtle	and	depend	on	very	specific	linguistic	evidence	that	may	not	be	available	in	
other	areas	such	as	real	analysis	and	set	theory.	For	all	we	know,	externalism	could	be	true	of	talk	of	real	
numbers	and	sets	in	which	case	we	would	need	a	separate	approach	to	the	relevant	variation	on	the	
central	tension	in	each	case.	Whatever	the	case,	Hofweber	rejects	the	presumption	that	we	should	
expect	a	uniform	solution	to	all	these	puzzles.		
Internalism,	after	all,	is	not	a	blanket	approach	to	ontological	questions.	Hofweber	(2016,	
Chapter	7)	is	careful	to	develop	the	case	for	the	external	reading	of	quantification	over	material	objects	
in	ordinary	discourse.	This	means,	for	him,	that	the	basic	ontological	question	of	whether	something	is	a	
material	object	is	not	one	we	can	settle	from	the	armchair;	it	is	an	empirical	question	to	be	settled	by	
other	parts	of	inquiry.	
In	sum,	Hofweber	advocates	a	language	first	approach	to	ontology:	if	you	want	to	solve	the	
primary	ontological	question	for	a	given	domain	of	discourse,	figure	out,	first,	whether	internalism	or	
externalism	is	true	of	that	domain.	Careful	reflection	on	the	available	linguistic	evidence	should	guide	
the	question	of	whether	any	appropriate	substitutions	for	the	quantifiers	are	indeed	referential	
expressions.	If	the	answer	is	‘no’	and	quantifiers	are	generally	read	internally,	then	the	answer	to	the	
primary	ontological	question	falls	under	the	remit	of	metaphysics	and	is	guaranteed	to	be	‘no’;	
otherwise,	if	the	quantifiers	are	generally	read	externally,	then	the	answer	to	the	primary	ontological	
question	is	no	longer	guaranteed	to	be	‘no’	but	it	will	fall	under	the	remit	of	other	areas	of	inquiry.		
The	primacy	of	linguistic	considerations	and	the	fact	that	central	ontological	questions	are	
partly	individuated	by	the	language	in	which	they	are	couched	place	important	limits	on	the	scope	of	the	
answers	they	receive.	Even	if	one	answers	the	primary	ontological	question	of	whether	there	are	
numbers	–	as	phrased	in	English,	there	are,	by	Hofweber's	lights,	significant	limits	to	what	one,	may	
have	accomplished	at	this	point.	For	he	is	careful	to	explain	that	a	negative	answer	to	the	ontological	
question	as	to	whether	something	is	a	number	provides	little	or	no	support	for	nominalism.	Forget	
whether	numerical	expressions	are	referential	as	used	in	arithmetic	and	ordinary	numerical	discourse,	
maybe	there	are	von	Neumann	ordinals	or	abstract	positions	in	an	*-structure;	these	abstract	objects	
would	be	numberlike	in	that	they	would	enjoy	many	of	the	central	features	externalists	associate	with	
natural	numbers.	And	there	may	even	be	a	language	other	than	English	that	comes	equipped	with	words	
that	are	used	referentially	to	pick	them	out.	Even	if	externalism	turned	out	to	be	true	of	talk	of	these	
numberlike	objects	in	the	new	hypothetical	language,	this	observation	would	be	quite	irrelevant	for	the	
question	of	whether	something	is	a	number	as	phrased	in	English.	Whether	the	external	domain	of	
objects	contains	numberlike	objects	with	some	of	the	central	features	externalist	associate	with	numbers	
is	beyond	the	scope	of	the	primary	ontological	question	associated	with	arithmetical	discourse.	
	In	what	remains,	I	would	like	to	focus	on	the	case	of	propositional	discourse	as	another	case	
study,	one	with	ramifications	for	even	larger	metaphysical	questions.	
	
2. Internalism	and	Propositional	Discourse	
The	book	touches	on	the	ontological	question	of	whether	there	are	propositions	and	its	ramifications	for	
the	ambitions	of	metaphysics.	On	the	approach	outlined	in	the	book,	the	crucial	issue	is	whether	
internalism	or	externalism	is	true	of	propositional	discourse.	If	externalism	is	true,	then	that-clauses	
refer	to	propositions	to	be	found	in	the	external	domain	of	objects.	Internalism,	on	the	other	hand,	
insists	on	an	internal	reading	of	quantification	over	propositions.	
Some	philosophers	take	externalism	to	provide	the	best	explanation	of	the	validity	of	simple	
quantificational	inferences.	Consider,	for	example:	
(1) Alice	believes	that	snow	is	white.	
(2) Alice	believes	something.	
They	construe	a	that-clause	like	'that	snow	is	white'	as	a	referential	term	for	a	proposition;	they	take	
attitude	verbs	like	'believe'	to	involve	a	binary	relation	between	an	agent	and	a	proposition;	and	they	
conceive	of	the	inference	from	(1)	to	(2)	as	an	instance	of	existential	generalization	whose	conclusion	
requires	the	external	domain	to	contain	at	least	one	proposition.	They	presuppose,	in	other	words,	an	
external	reading	of	the	quantifier.	
Hofweber	has	no	quarrel	with	the	validity	of	the	inference	but	he	objects	to	the	externalist	gloss	
of	the	conclusion.	On	the	internal	reading	of	the	quantifier,	the	truth	of	the	conclusion	places	no	
demands	on	reality	over	and	above	the	truth	of	a	sentence	of	the	form	‘Alice	believes	that	p’	where	‘p’	is	
replaced	for	a	sentence	of	the	language.	More	generally,	the	truth	conditions	of	‘Alice	believes	
something’	are	equivalent	to	the	truth	conditions	of	an	infinitary	disjunction	of	the	form	
‘ %+#,-	.-+#-/-$	[!ℎ2!	3]5 ’	for	each	replacement	of	p	for	a	sentence	of	our	language.	Since	(1)	is	one	of	
these	disjuncts,	we	have	that	(2)	logically	follows	from	(1).	In	other	words,	the	internal	reading	of	the	
quantifier	provides	a	rival	account	of	the	validity	of	the	quantificational	inferences	in	question.	
Hofweber	(2016,	Chapter	8)	breaks	the	stand	off	by	noting	that	on	balance,	reflection	on	the	
available	linguistic	evidence	suggests	that	that-clauses	are	in	fact	not	referential	expressions,	and	
whatever	else	their	semantic	role	may	be,	it	is	not	to	refer	to	a	proposition.	So,	Hofweber	suggests,	
internalism	is	the	only	game	in	town.	
This	makes	the	central	ontological	question	of	whether	something	is	a	proposition	–	read	
externally	–	to	be	part	and	parcel	of	metaphysics,	but	at	the	same	time	according	to	Hofweber,	it	
guarantees	a	negative	answer	to	it:	there	are	no	propositions	to	be	found	in	the	external	domain	of	
objects.	This	is	not	to	deny	that	there	are	hard	metaphysical	questions	in	the	vicinity.	Internalism	is	not	
meant	to	help	us,	for	example,	with	questions	of	fineness	of	grain:	are	necessarily	equivalent	
propositions	one	and	the	same?	And	if	facts	are	true	propositions,	we	still	face	the	question	of	how	fine	
grained	reality	itself	is.	These,	and	similar	questions,	require	a	separate	treatment	and	remain	as	
difficult	for	the	internalist	as	they	are	for	the	externalist.	
There’s	a	hitch.	Internalism	appears	to	face	a	formidable	objection.3	No	matter	how	expressively	
rich	one	may	take	English	to	be,	few	might	be	inclined	to	think	that	it	is	rich	enough	to	express	each	and	
every	proposition.	Some	propositions,	you	may	think,	are	not	expressible	in	English	much	like	it	seems	
to	us,	for	example,	that	many	propositions	we	routinely	express	in	English	could	have	not	been	
expressed	by	a	sentence	of	ancient	Greek.	And	yet,	(3)	below	comes	out	false	when	the	quantifier	is	read	
internally:	
(3) Something	is	not	expressible	in	English.	
Internalists	read	(3)	to	be	equivalent	to	an	infinitary	disjunction:	
(4) !ℎ2!	3 	#$	67!	-839-$$#.+-	#6	:6;+#$ℎ5 ,	
whose	instances	result	from	a	substitution	of	an	English	sentence	for	‘p’.	Since	no	such	instance	can	be	
true,	the	disjunction	comes	out	false.	It	would	seem	a	mistake	to	conclude	that	English	is	expressively	
complete	in	ways	in	which	more	impoverished	languages	may	not	be.	For	a	parallel	argument	would	
have	been	available	to	a	speaker	of	ancient	Greek,	even	though,	in	hindsight,	it	may	seem	to	us	that	they	
lacked	the	resources	to	express	the	proposition	that	Alpha	Centauri	is	a	constellation	or	that	there	are	
quarks.	What	gives?	
Many	sentences	of	English	contain	context-sensitive	expressions,	which	make	a	difference	to	
what	an	utterance	of	the	sentence	by	a	given	speaker	may	express	relative	to	one	context	or	another.	
This	suggests	a	distinction	between	what	can	be	expressed	by	an	utterance	of	a	context-independent	
sentence	in	a	given	language	and	what	can	be	expressed	by	an	utterance	of	a	context-sensitive	sentence	
of	the	language	at	a	context.	Even	the	latter	calls	for	a	distinction	between	what	can	be	expressed	by	a	
context-sensitive	sentence	of	the	language	at	an	actual	context	and	what	can	be	expressed	at	one	context	
or	another	–	regardless	whether	any	speakers	of	the	language	ever	find	themselves	in	them.	This	
difference	motivates	a	distinction	between	three	conceptions	of	expressibility,	which	correspond	to	at	
least	three	different	theses	in	the	vicinity	of	(4).	The	first	two	aren’t	very	plausible	at	all	for	a	language	
like	ancient	Greek	–	or	even	English:	there’s	no	reason	to	assume	ancient	Greek	contains	a	context-
independent	sentence	a	speaker	could	use	to	express	the	proposition	that	Alpha	Centauri	is	a	
constellation.4	Nor	is	it	clear	ancient	Greek	speakers	ever	found	themselves	in	a	position	to	use	a	
context-sensitive	sentence	to	express	the	proposition	that	Alpha	Centauri	is	a	constellation.	No	matter,	
Hofweber	thinks,	there	could	have	still	been	a	context	in	which	Alpha	Centauri	is	referred	to	by	a	
context-sensitive	expression	by	a	speaker	of	ancient	Greek.		
In	order	to	accommodate	quantification	over	propositions	–	whether	merely	expressible	by	
utterances	of	context-independent	or	expressible	by	utterances	of	context-sensitive	sentences	relative	
to	one	context	or	another	–	Hofweber	models	the	truth	conditions	of	quantified	sentences	in	an	
interpreted	formal	language	equipped	with	external	quantification.	The	truth	conditions	of	an	
existentially	quantified	sentence	of	the	form	(5)	are	given	by	(6)	–	where	the	outer	quantifiers	are	read	
externally	to	range	over	eligible	referents	for	context-sensitive	expressions	of	the	target	language:	
(5) Some	proposition	is	A.	
(6) ∃8 !ℎ2!	3 8 	#$	%5 .	
In	particular,	(3)	becomes:	
(7) ∃8 !ℎ2!	3 8 	#$	67!	-839-$$#.+-	#6	:6;+#$ℎ5 .	
The	claim	is	true	on	the	first	two	conceptions	of	expressibility	and	false	on	the	third	one.	But	whatever	
confidence	we	have	in	the	falsity	of	(3)	should	no	longer	be	undermined	by	the	apparent	inability	to	
express	the	proposition	that	Alpha	Centauri	is	a	constellation	by	a	context-independent	sentence	in	a	
language	like	ancient	Greek	–	or	the	fact	that	no	ancient	Greek	speakers	may	have	found	themselves	in	a	
position	to	use	a	context-sensitive	sentence	to	express	that	proposition.	The	story	is	more	complicated	
for	the	proposition	that	there	are	quarks,	but	there	is	no	reason	to	think	it	cannot	be	given.	
Notice,	however,	that	we	need	a	more	discriminating	conception	of	expressibility	for	(3)	to	draw	
a	real	contrast	between	internalism	and	externalism.	Externalists,	after	all,	take	apparent	quantification	
over	propositions	to	be	restricted	quantification	over	the	external	domain.	Since	propositions	are	
objects,	they	too	are	eligible	referents	for	context-sensitive	expressions	at	a	context,	and	whether	or	not	
an	English	speaker	ever	finds	herself	in	a	context	at	which	a	given	proposition	is	referred	to	by	a	
context-sensitive	expression,	there’s	no	reason	to	think	there	couldn’t	be	such	a	context.	One	may	
perhaps	question	whether	the	mere	fact	that	a	proposition	p	is	eligible	to	be	the	referent	of	a	context-
sensitive	expression	of	the	language	suffices	for	the	proposition	to	be	expressible.	For	one	may	again	
require	us	to	find	a	sentence	of	the	language	to	express	p	at	a	context.	But	unless	propositions	are	very	
fine	grained	indeed,	it	would	seem	that	an	utterance	of	the	sentence	‘that	is	the	case’	at	a	carefully	
chosen	context	should	be	able	to	express	one	and	the	same	as	proposition	as	p.5	
Internalism	helps	with	the	question	of	whether	we	can,	in	fact,	expect	our	metaphysical	
theorizing	to	proceed	unconstrained	from	any	representational	limitations	on	our	part.	Facts	are	
correlated	to	true	propositions	–	indeed,	some	take	facts	to	be	true	propositions.	If	you	take	reality	to	
consist	of	facts,	you	may	naturally	expect	some	of	them	to	lie	beyond	our	ken.	But	as	Hofweber	is	careful	
to	note,	we	must	fix	what	counts	as	a	relevant	representational	limitation	in	order	to	properly	asses	this	
hypothesis.	And	he	opts	for	what	he	calls	an	object	permitting	conception	of	ineffability:	whether	a	
proposition	–	or	fact	–	is	ineffable	cannot	be	a	matter	of	our	inability	to	represent	an	object	in	the	
external	domain.	On	this	understanding	of	ineffability,	it	follows	from	internalism	that	there	are	no	
limits	to	what	we	can	represent	in	thought	and	language.	
Hofweber	(2016)	uses	this	observation	to	allay	the	dark	vision	according	to	which	we	lack	
representational	access	to	large-scale	features	of	reality	that	lie	beyond	our	ken.	Since	there	are	no	
limits	to	what	we	can	represent	in	thought	and	language,	there	are	no	restrictions	on	the	ambitions	of	
metaphysics.	This	is	again	supposed	to	mark	a	real	contrast	between	internalism	and	externalism:	
externalists	take	that-clauses	to	be	referential	and	quantification	into	their	position	to	range	over	
propositions	conceived	as	objects	in	the	external	domain.	If	the	external	domain	is,	as	is	plausible	to	
assume,	independent	of	thought	and	language,	externalists	shouldn’t	expect	to	be	able	to	represent	
every	proposition	in	thought	and	language.	There’s	no	reason	to	think	that	a	finite	mind	like	ours,	which	
developed	in	a	certain	environment	as	a	result	of	certain	selection	pressures,	should	be	able	to	represent	
any	fact	whatever.	Instead,	the	default	assumption	should	be	the	ineffability	thesis	according	to	which	
some	propositional	aspects	of	reality	are,	in	fact,	ineffable.		
Externalists,	according	to	Hofweber,	should	approach	metaphysics	with	a	dose	of	modesty	and	
humility.	They	should	think	there	are	severe	limits	on	what	metaphysics	can	accomplish.	But	this	again	
requires	a	more	discriminating	conception	of	ineffability.	On	the	object-permitting	conception	of	
ineffability,	there	mere	fact	that	we	cannot	represent	an	object	in	the	external	domain	is	never	a	relevant	
limitation.	Since	propositions	–	and	facts	–	are,	for	the	externalist,	objects	in	the	external	domain,	it	looks	
like	we	can,	for	purposes	of	assessing	the	ineffability	thesis,	grant	that	we	can	have	a	representation	of	
them.		Now,	to	be	sure,	the	question	of	whether	a	fact	is	ineffable	is	not	the	question	of	whether	it	is	ever	
an	eligible	referent	for	an	expression	at	a	context	but	rather	whether	we	can	utter	a	sentence	that	
expresses,	states,	or	represents	that	fact.	But	whatever	the	nature	of	the	fact,	if	we	can	refer	to	it,	by	the	
lights	of	externalists,	we	can	presumably	represent	the	proposition	that	it	is	the	case.		
	
3. Propositional	Externalism	Revisited	
Whatever	you	make	of	the	internalist	program,	the	problem,	according	to	Hofweber,	is	that	there	is	no	
real	alternative	to	it	when	it	comes	to	propositional	discourse	–	or	at	least	not	if	that-clauses	are	not	
referential	terms.	Let	us	grant	that	on	balance,	the	linguistic	evidence	provides	sufficient	support	for	this	
claim.	6	We	now	explore	the	question	of	whether	there	is	an	alternative	construal	of	the	external	reading	
of	the	quantifier	in	(2),	one	on	which	it	would	still	have	a	representational	role,	though	not	one	that	
requires	it	to	range	over	any	objects	in	an	external	domain.	
What	I	have	in	mind	is	the	type-theoretic	perspective	inspired	by	the	work	of	Frege	and	Church	
and,	more	recently,	advocated	by	philosophers	like	Tim	Williamson.	On	their	picture,	there	is	an	
alignment	between	certain	grammatical	categories	and	the	type-theoretic	hierarchy:	singular	terms	are	
expressions	of	type	e.	An	expression	of	type	(!?, … , !B)	combines	with	expressions	of	types	!?,		…,	!B,	
respectively,	to	form	a	sentence.	A	sentence	is	itself	an	expression	of	type	(),	whereas	some	monadic	
predicates	combining	with	expressions	of	type	e	to	form	sentences	is	an	expression	of	type	(-).	
Quantifiers	come	in	different	types:	if	a	unary	quantifier	combines	with	an	expression	of	type	(-)	to	form	
a	sentence	–	much	like	in	‘something	is	red’	–	it	has	type	((-)).	But	if	the	unary	quantifier	combines	with	
an	expression	of	type	(())	to	form	a	sentence	–	much	like	in	‘something	is	true’	–	it	receives	type	((())).	
On	a	set-theoretic	semantics	for	the	theory	of	types,	expressions	of	type	(!?, … , !B)	are	assigned	
sets	of	n-tuples	of	semantic	values	for	expressions	of	types	!?,		…,	!B,	respectively.	This	is	not,	however,	
the	interpretation	these	philosophers	have	in	mind;	instead,	they	take	expressions	of	type	(!?, … , !B)		to	
correspond	to	irreducible	n-ary	relations	whose	arguments	correspond	to	expressions	of	types	!?,		…,	!B,	
respectively.	On	this	picture,	propositions	are	0-ary	relations	that	correspond	to	sentences	of	type	(),	
predicates	of	type	(())	combine	with	them	to	form	sentences,	and	unary	propositional	quantifiers	are	
expressions	of	type	((())).	
These	philosophers	are	of	course	careful	to	distinguish	quantification	into	different	grammatical	
positions,	and	they	deny	that	quantification	into	predicate	or	sentence	position	–	read	externally	–	is	
quantification	over	a	domain	of	objects.	Predicates,	after	all,	do	not	refer,	they	predicate,	and,	the	
thought	goes,	it	would	be	a	mistake	to	understand	quantification	into	predicate	position	as	
quantification	over	a	domain	of	objects	to	which	predicates	refer.	Likewise,	for	quantification	into	
sentence	position.	This	tradition	grants	a	representational	role	to	all	these	quantifiers	in	that	they	take	
the	world	to	be	portrayed	to	come	with	an	external	domain	in	the	form	of	a	type-theoretic	hierarchy	of	
objects	and	irreducible	relations	of	different	types.		
There’s	a	familiar	expressive	problem	for	the	position:	one	may	be	tempted	to	describe	these	
relations	as	the	semantic	values	of	expressions	of	different	categories.	But	now	one	may	object:	what	
could	these	semantic	values	be,	if	not	objects?	A	better	characterization	of	the	type-theoretic	hierarchy	
would	need	to	appeal	to	the	very	expressive	resources	we	want	to	interpret.7	But	whatever	force	the	
objection	may	have,	what	matters	for	present	purposes	is	that	the	position	opens	the	way	for	an	
externalist	reading	of	propositional	quantification	on	which	that-clauses	needn’t	be	referential.		
Hofweber	(2016)	briefly	mentions	similar	moves	in	the	vicinity	but	objects	that	it’s	not	enough	
to	say	that	these	quantifiers	are	primitive	and	that	they	cannot	be	spelled	out	other	than	in	terms	of	
themselves.	If	there	is	a	difference	between	all	these	quantifiers,	one	should	explain	what	it	is	and	how	it	
emerges	in	the	first	place.	
That’s	a	tall	order	of	course.	But	one	could	perhaps	begin	with	the	observation	is	that	there	is	an	
inferential	characterization	of	the	external	reading	of	the	existential	quantifier	of	type	(-)	on	which	it	
corresponds	to	a	restriction	on	the	internal	reading.	This	may	seem	in	tension	with	the	claim	that	a	
sentence	of	the	form	‘something	is	A’,	read	externally,	can	be	true	even	if	no	sentence	of	the	form	‘t	is	A’	
is	true	for	any	substitution	for	the	quantifier.8	However,	the	distinction	between	context-independent	
and	context-dependent	instances	of	a	quantifier	can	be	used	to	navigate	this	obstacle.	The	key	again	is	to	
make	a	distinction	between	what	it	is	for	a	context-independent	expression	to	refer	to	an	object	in	an	
external	domain	and	what	it	is	for	a	speaker	to	use	a	context-sensitive	expression	to	refer	to	it	relative	to	
a	context.	There	is,	moreover,	a	distinction	between	what	a	context-sensitive	expression	refers	to	in	
actual	contexts,	and	what	it	could	refer	to	in	a	context	–	regardless	whether	any	actual	speakers	of	the	
language	ever	find	themselves	in	it.	
The	external	reading	of	the	existential	quantifier	of	type	((-))	is	governed	by	the	rule	of	
existential	generalization,	which	is	now	implicitly	relativized	to	a	context	–	whether	actual	or	not:	
• from	‘t	is	A’,	infer	‘something	is	A’,	
where	t	is	a	referential	term	of	type	e,	which	successfully	performs	its	referential	function	relative	to	the	
context.	And	indeed,	the	external	reading	of	the	unary	existential	quantifier	appears	to	align	with	the	
corresponding	restriction	of	the	internal	reading	of	the	quantifier.	
What’s	a	referential	term?	It's	a	linguistic	expression	whose	primary	semantic	function	is	to	refer	
to	an	object.	Names	are	paradigmatic	referential	terms,	but	other	expressions	may	play	the	role	as	well.	
Moreover,	some	of	them	may	play	the	referential	role	only	relative	to	a	context	of	utterance.	A	
demonstrative,	for	example,	can	refer	to	an	object	relative	to	a	context	of	utterance.	The	appeal	to	
context	is	supposed	to	help	with	the	case	in	which	some	object	is	indeed	A	even	if	nothing	that	is	A	is	
ever	denoted	by	any	context-insensitive	referential	term	of	the	language.	For	if	something	is	indeed	A,	
then	there	could	still	be	a	context	and	a	context-sensitive	expression	that	would	denote	an	object	that	is	
A	relative	to	it.	On	this	approach,	the	external	reading	of	the	existential	quantifier	of	type	((-))	
corresponds	to	a	proper	restriction	of	its	internal	reading,	one	which	restricts	the	range	of	eligible	
substitutions	to	referential	terms	–	some	of	which	may	be	context-sensitive	–	which	successfully	
performs	their	referential	function	relative	to	a	context,	whether	actual	or	not.		
The	hope	now	would	be	to	motivate	the	external	reading	of	quantification	into	other	
grammatical	positions	as	aligned	with	a	certain	restriction	of	the	internal	reading,	one	on	which	we	
restrict	the	range	of	eligible	substitutions	for	the	quantifier	to	expressions	of	the	relevant	grammatical	
category	that	successfully	perform	their	primary	semantic	function	relative	to	a	context,	regardless	of	
whether	any	actual	speakers	ever	find	themselves	in	it.9	Sentences	are	not	referential	expressions,	but	
when	competent	speakers	encounters	one,	they	expect	it	to	come	with	a	semantic	value	conceived	here	
as	an	irreducible	0-place	relation.	10	Some	0-place	relations	may	of	course	be	expressed	by	context-
insensitive	sentences,	but	a	great	many	of	them	may	not	be.	When	we	use	a	quantifier	of	type	((()))	to	
externally	quantify	into	sentence	position,	we	restrict	the	range	of	eligible	substitutions	for	the	internal	
reading	to	context-sensitive	and	context-insensitive	expressions	of	type	()	that	successfully	perform	
their	semantic	function	relative	to	a	context,	whether	actual	or	not.	On	this	picture,	if	something	is	A	–	
where,	very	roughly,	‘something’	is	understood	as	a	quantifier	of	type	((()))	read	externally	–	there	
could	be	a	context	and	a	context-sensitive	expression	of	type	(),	which,	relative	to	that	context,	expresses	
a	0-place	relation	that	is	indeed	A.	The	external	reading	of	quantification	into	sentence	position	becomes	
a	device	for	generalization	of	successful	semantic	role	for	expressions	of	type	()	relative	to	a	context,	
whether	actual	or	not.	And	this	in	turn	amounts	to	a	generalization	over	irreducible	0-place	relations.11		
The	type-theoretic	approach	comes	with	an	alternative	account	for	the	validity	of	simple	
quantificational	inferences.	The	argument	from	(1)	to	(2)	above	is	an	instance	of	existential	
generalization	for	the	propositional	quantifier.	This	is	still	compatible	with	different	proposals	for	
regimentation.	You	may	take	the	argument	to	involve	a	sentential	operator,	‘Alice	believes	that’,	in	which	
case	that	clauses	appear	to	play	no	role	in	the	argument,	or	you	may	nevertheless	think	of	a	that	clause	
as	a	device	for	nominalization,	which	is	itself	not	a	referential	expression.12	What	is	important	for	us	is	
that	there	is	no	need	to	conceive	of	that-clauses	as	referential	expressions.	
Unlike	other	formulations	of	propositional	externalism,	this	version	makes	room	for	a	
distinction	between	the	view	of	reality	as	a	totality	of	objects	and	the	view	of	reality	as	a	totality	of	facts.	
Neither	facts	nor	propositions	more	generally	are	objects.	Nor	there	is	any	reason	to	think	that	the	
object-permitting	conception	of	ineffability	can	help	us	come	closer	to	being	able	to	express	that	a	given	
fact	is	the	case.	Whether	this	leaves	us	vulnerable	to	the	dark	vision	will	now	depend	on	what	conception	
of	ineffability	we	use	to	assess	the	ineffability	thesis.13	But	that’s	a	topic	for	another	occasion.	The	goal	
here	has	merely	been	to	explore	the	prospects	of	an	alternative	construal	of	propositional	externalism;	
whether	the	approach	places	any	constraints	on	the	ambitions	of	metaphysics	is	an	important,	though	
separate	question.14		
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1	Otherwise,	we	could	move	from	‘nothing	is	non-self-identical’	to	‘something	is	non-self-identical’.	The	
decision	is	harder	for	other	expressions.	Should,	for	example,	definite	descriptions	like	‘the	author	of	Ontology	
and	the	Ambitions	of	Metaphysics’	be	eligible	substitutions	for	t?	
	
2	Hofweber	(2016)	undertakes	this	task	in	appendix	3.7	in	p.	168.	
																																																								
																																																																																																																																																																																		
	
3	See	Hofweber	2006	for	further	discussion	of	this	problem.	
	
4	There	is	nothing	special	about	ancient	Greek	here.	There	is	no	reason	to	think	that	English	should	contain	
for	each	real	number,	a	context-independent	sentence	a	speaker	could	use	to	express	the	proposition	that	it	is	
irrational	at	any	context.	
	
5	Externalists	might	of	course	object	to	the	analysis	of	the	truth	conditions	of	(3)	in	terms	of	(7).	The	point	is	
merely	that	whatever	proposition	in	the	external	domain	is	assigned	to	the	free	variable	x	in	the	open	
sentence	‘x	is	not	expressible	in	English’	should	itself	be	an	eligible	referent	for	a	context-sensitive	expression	
in	English,	e.g.,	a	demonstrative	like	‘that’.	And,	moreover,	it	should	be	expressed	by	an	utterance	of	a	
sentence	of	the	form	‘that	is	the	case’	at	a	carefully	crafted	context.	
	
6	This	is	amply	supported	and	documented	in	chapter	8	of	Hofweber	2016.	
	
7	This	familiar	expressive	limitation	is	of	course	related	to	Frege's	infamous	concept	horse	problem.	This	and	
related	concerns	are	discussed,	for	example,	in	chapter	5	of	Williamson	2013.	
	
8	This	will	happen	whenever	the	truth	of	the	external	reading	of	the	quantifier	comes	down	to	the	existence	of	
an	object	in	the	external	domain	of	quantification	that	is	A	despite	the	fact	that	we	lack	a	term	for	it.	
	
9	Wright	(2007)	has	argued,	more	generally,	for	a	picture	of	external	quantification	as	a	device	for	
generalization	of	semantic	role.	
	
10
	For	a	broad	outline	of	the	idea	that	our	grasp	of	sentential	quantifiers	is	rooted	in	our	grasp	of	sentences,	
see	Williamson	2003	and,	more	recently,	chapter	5	of	Williamson	2013.		
	
11	These	remarks	are	not	meant	to	suggest	a	reductive	account	of	the	external	reading	of	quantification	into	
sentence	position	merely	in	terms	of	the	internal	reading.	For	they	remain	silent	as	to	what	it	is	for	something	
to	count	as	an	eligible	substitution	of	the	quantifier	relative	to	a	context,	and	what	it	takes	for	a	sentence	to	
successfully	perform	its	semantic	function.	Someone	could,	for	example,	deny	that	any	eligible	substitutions	
could	themselves	include	quantification	into	sentence	position.	So,	she	would	question	that	sentence	like	
‘something	is	true’	could	ever	be	an	eligible	substitution	for	the	internal	quantifier.	
	
12	The	first	alternative	is	advocated	by	Prior	1971	and	a	version	of	the	second	is	discussed,	for	example,	by	
Recanati	(2004).	
	
13	Though	far-fetched,	I	can	imagine	a	theorist	making	the	case	for	a	relation-permitting	conception	of	
ineffability	according	to	which	whether	a	proposition	is	ineffable	cannot	merely	be	a	matter	of	our	inability	to	
represent	a	relation	in	the	external	domain.	
	
14	For	helpful	comments	and	discussion,	thanks	to	Matti	Eklund,	Jeremy	Goodman,	and	Thomas	Hofweber.	
